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Abstract 
 
Banking reform has proved to be one of the most problematic elements of economic transition in central 
and eastern Europe. Therefore the paper considers the development of the Estonian banking sector and 
derives individual banks´ fragility scores during transition. To this end we use option-based tools and 
equity prices to estimate distance-to-default measures of banks´ distress probabilities. Overall, the 
results suggest that market indicators are moderately useful for anticipating future financial distress and 
rating changes in transition economies. The implication for an effective supervisory framework is to use 
a plurality of risk scores when assessing bank vulnerability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The number of countries experiencing banking problems has increased dramatically in recent years,  
with banking crises striking industrial, developing and transition economies alike.1 Furthermore, the 
high costs and macroeconomic disruptions caused by such banking crises have become a matter of 
increasing concern in the international financial community. Effective supervisory capabilities are thus 
vital to limit the adverse impact of these crises. Therefore, the potential for early warning models of 
bank vulnerability to serve as supervisory tools has been the subject of a sustained research effort in 
recent years.  
From the existing literature on banking crises two distinct lines of thought on the phenomenon have 
emerged. The first views banking crises as being related to the macroeconomic business cycle and 
triggered by sudden changes in perceived aggregate risk. In other words, banks fail through exposure to 
the same common shock. The second considers banking crises to be random events, unrelated to 
changes in the macro economy. For example, banking crises can arise as a result of self-fulfilling 
expectations, as modelled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), among others. They consider a model with 
two equilibria, with the “bad one” leading to a self-fulfilling, sunspots-based liquidity crisis in the 
banking sector. Allen and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2002) model theoretically the idea of 
contagion arising from the spreading of bank failure through interbank exposures with potentially 
destabilising consequences for the economy as a whole.2  
The qualitative banking and currency crisis literature, beginning with Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), 
typically focuses on a combination of events in order to define what constitutes as the beginning of a 
banking crisis. These may include: (i) bank runs that lead to a closure, merger or takeover by the public 
sector of one or more financial institutions; and (ii) in the absence of runs, the closure, merger, or 
takeover of one or more banks or large-scale government assistance to prevent a potential bank run.3  
The theoretical and qualitative literature raises the empirical question of how to measure banking 
fragility or banking crisis precisely. Can the complexity of a crisis be captured by a single indicator? In 
view of this, our objective is to develop a quantitative fragility score that could predict a banking crisis, 
and thereby ensuring that less time is devoted to defining the crisis itself. 
This paper is composed as follows. In Section 2 the restructuring of the Estonian banking sector during 
transition is briefly reviewed. The distance-to-default measure is constructed in Section 3. In Section 4 
                                                          
1 Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) provide a list of 117 systemic banking crises that have occurred in 93 countries 
since the late 1970s. The paper also provides information on 51 borderline and small (nonsystemic) banking crises 
in 45 countries. Systemic banking crises, in their definition, are those in which much or all of the banking capital 
in the country is exhausted. These might sound like rare events, but crises have actually occurred so frequently, in 
so many countries that they must be considered a global policy issue. According to Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), 
Estonia experienced systemic banking crises from 1992 to 1995 and a borderline banking crisis in 1998. 
2 A survey of theoretical models of systemic risk in banking markets is provided in De Brandt and Hartmann 
(2000).  
3 Recently, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 2001, 2005) have combined the qualitative approach with a 
limited number of quantitative criteria. 
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comprehensive case studies are conducted in order to evaluate the merits and practical usefulness of the 
methodology with respect to actual Estonian market data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
to analyse the development and risk of Estonian banks with a dataset of similar quality. The timing and 
information content of the distance-to-default measures are critically evaluated in section 5. In Section 6 
conclusions, as well as a number of policy implications, are presented.  
 
2. Estonian Banking Sector Development and Restructuring During Transition 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the unprecedented transformation of the Estonian Banking 
system during the transition process of ten years. Initially Estonia inherited a Soviet-style monobank 
system under which specialised state banks serviced specific sectors of the economy. After regaining 
the independence in August 1991 Estonia immediately launched the transition process and began 
developing a modern two-tier banking system with the central bank as its core.4 In June 1992 the 
Estonian national currency, the Estonian EEK, was re-introduced under a currency board system and 
linked to the Deutsche mark (EEK 8 = DEM 1).5 
At the beginning of the transition period Estonia had a very liberal policy toward the licensing of new 
commercial banks. A large number of banks, it was thought, would provide the lending needed to 
support the emerging private sector.6 Little thought was given initially to the implications of this policy 
with respect to bank soundness and supervision. Therefore, many banks established in early years of 
transition lacked the necessary expertise and capital base for running a sustainable banking business.   
The first systemic full-blown banking crisis to hit Estonia surfaced in 1992-1993. A large proportion of 
the newly founded credit institutions were not in a position to withstand the numerous stresses and 
strains associated with such a crisis. Among the most critical precipitators of such bank distress are: 
pre-monetary reform deposit withdrawal; high costs of funding; weak banking skills and 
mismanagement; small, but overly risky, loan portfolios; as well as poor accountability and 
inexperienced supervision.7 In the wake of the crisis, more than one-fourth of the banking system went 
bankrupt and the number of institutions fell sharply, from 42 in 1992 to 24 at the end of 1993. Among 
other things, Eesti Pank suspended operations of the country´s three largest banks. Tartu Commercial 
Bank was closed and liquidated, the Northern Estonian Bank and the Union Baltic Bank were merged 
                                                          
4 During the transition period Estonia earned the nickname “Tiger of the Baltics”. When taking-off Estonia has got 
two things right. The first is openess to foreign trade which is strongly associated with economic growth. The 
second is competition from foreign firms, whether at home or in export markets, sharply raising productivity. 
5 The currency board system means that Eesti Pank lending to commercial banks is only possible if there are 
sufficient excess reserves beyond the amount of foreign exchange reserves necessary to match the currency in 
circulation. This has indeed been the case in Estonia, since reserves expanded strongly since 1992. 
6 Contrary to several CEE countries (e.g. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary), the newly incorporated Estonian 
banks did not inherit a huge stock of bad loans from the Soviet era. 
7 For example, in the first years of the transition from central planning to a market-based system banks continued 
to use the old Soviet Gosbank chart of accounts. In Estonia banks were required to use IAS accounting and 
reporting requirements for the first time in 1995, although the stronger banks have begun doing so already in 
1993.   
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into one entity and recapitalised. The new entity was launched under the name North Estonia Bank. The 
increase of the minimum capital requirements from EEK 500,000 to EEK 6 million in October 1992 
triggered solvency problems and finally the liquidation of eight small credit institutions in early 1993. 
In March 1993, ten small rural banks were merged into a new bank Eesti Ühispank (Union Bank of 
Estonia). Despite this market shakeout, however, stability was not achieved. In 1994 the largest bank at 
the time, Eesti Sotsiaalpank (Social Bank), experienced liquidity problems and failed in May 1995. 
The beginning of a new era in Estonian financial sector development was marked by the enactment of 
the Law on Credit Institutions in December 1994, which increased the central bank´s supervision and 
enforcement capabilities and incorporated the standards of relevant EU laws. The subsequent years put 
the banks under severe pressure, forcing weaker players out of the market. The plan for improvements 
in prudential requirements was particularly challenging - within just four years the bank’s own funds 
were required to reach the level of 5 million ECU, i.e. the level that most European banks adhere to. 
While the strongest market players were able to accumulate the required capital with new issues on 
stock market and reinvestments, the weakest had only two options: merge or close down. Stringent 
capital standards were aimed at consolidating the banking sector, thereby ensuring the improved 
efficiency and competitiveness. By the end of 1996 the number of banks had shrunk to a more 
reasonable, although not scale-efficient, level of 13 institutions.8 
On 2 April 1997, as a reflection of the strain being exerted on Asian financial markets, the central bank 
issued a statement warning that increases in foreign funding would open banks to adverse spillover 
effects from international capital markets. The statement also underlined the extra risks borne by 
overheated real and financial markets. To counter these developments various measures aiming at long-
term stability and crisis prevention were introduced.9 In practice though the timing of the restrictive 
actions coincided with a liquidity squeeze in the banking sector and impaired the institution’s capability 
to withstand distress. 
Financial turmoil on emerging Asian markets also led to spillover effects in Estonia. On “Black 
Thursday”, 23 October 1997 Tallinn Stock Exchange index (TALSE) plunged by 15%. Two months 
later TALSE had lost 54% of its pre-crash level and 62% of the peak level recorded on 29 August. 
Although the Estonian economy recovered relatively smoothly and GDP in 1997 increased by 10.5%, 
banks did not have time to recover fully from the stock market crash prior to the Russian crisis in 1998. 
Contraction in foreign funding, further devaluation of securities portfolios, impairment in credit 
portfolios, as well as restrictions in regulation led to substantial changes in the banking market.  
                                                          
8 Tang et al. (2000, pp. 34-36) have estimated the fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of the first and second systemic 
Estonian banking crisis (1992-93 and 1994-95) to be about 1.9% of GDP.   
9 The measures to prevent the expansionary developments include (i) an increased capital requirement of 10% 
instead of 8% as of October 1997; (ii) governmental reserves were transferred from domestic banks to foreign 
banks; (iii) an additional liquidity requirement of 2 % as of November 1997 and 3% as of December 1997 was 
introduced; (iv) effective July 1997 the risk category of claims to local governments was increased from 50% up 
to 100%; and (v) in December 1997 the general banking reserve requirement of 5% risk weighted assets became 
effective. 
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The crisis again took on a systemic scale in the second half of 1998 when five banks faced severe 
difficulties. These banks constituted 38% of all banking sector assets and approximately 40% of 
aggregate deposits. All of these banks were either strongly exposed to securities market and/or had a 
substantial share in projects related to Russia. The aggregate share of nonperforming loans reached the 
highest level a year after the culmination of Russian crisis, in mid 1999. 
By the beginning of 1998 it was clear that a market of less than 1.5 million inhabitants was not large 
enough to sustain eleven separate banks. The much-needed consolidation and restructuring of the overly 
fragmented banking sector decreased the number of banks again almost by half. Hitherto widely spread 
branch networks were cut down and replaced by electronic channels (ATM, internet banking etc). Cost-
efficiency and prudent management turned out to be the key factors in surviving the market distress. 
Two of the largest banks; Hansapank and Eesti Ühispank, covering more than 80% of market; were 
taken over by foreign investors.10 Three banks Eesti Maapank, EVEA pank and ERA Pank were forced 
to close down and two banks - Eesti Hoiupank and Tallinna Pank - were taken over by other domestic 
banks. One bank – Eesti Forexpank - was temporarily acquired by the central bank. Finally, in April 
2005 the sole bank publicly listed on Tallinn stock exchange – Hansapank - was fully overtaken by its 
strategic investor Swedbank. The financial strength, know-how and expertise of Scandinavian banks 
concerning risk management, marketing, product development and technology have been essential for 
the stable development of the Estonian banking sector. 
 
Figure 1: EBRD Index of Banking Sector Reform for Estonia 
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Note: “1” means little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system; “4+” corresponds to standards and 
performance norms of advanced industrial countries´ provision of full set of banking services. 0.3 decimal points 
have been added or subtracted for “+” or “-“ ratings.    
 
The gradual improvement in banking sector environment outlined above is also evident from the EBRD 
banking sector reform index, which demonstrates very low values in the pre-monetary reform period 
                                                          
10 Hansabank was acquired by Swedbank (60% stake) and Ühispank by SEB (32% stake). 
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and the increase in index from 3 at the end of 1996 up to 4 by the end of sample period in 2004. Thus 
the Estonian banking system has enjoyed a considerable improvement in competence, sophistication, 
and credibility.11 The tightened regulatory environment has eliminated banks unable to survive in the 
longer term and has helped the Estonian banking sector approach the optimum banking size and 
structure.  
A more detailed insight in to the development of the Estonian banking system over the period 1992 – 
2004 is presented in Table 1. The table reveals the number and distribution of the total number of banks 
in Estonia as well as the process of consolidation within the banking industry during the run-up to a 
more open banking-sector environment. 
 
Table 1: Selected Financial Sector Indicators for Estonia (End of Year) 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
# of Banks 42 21 21 15 13 11 6 7 7 7 7 7 9
# of Private 
Banks 
38 17 21 17 12 11 5 6 7 7 7 7 9
# of State-
Owned Banks 
2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Concentration 
index C2 (%) 
N/A 31.20 36.05 38.71 39.92 47.03 84.80 84.00 83.00 83.33 83.96 83.29 79.10
Concentration 
index C4 (%) 
N/A 57.10 60.00 65.00 68.00 77.00 98.00 98.00 97.36 97.56 97.65 97.84 97.90
Total Assets, 
EEK billion 
4.78 6.39 10.38 15.53 22.94 40.50 40.99 47.07 57.81 68.41 81.69 98.80 133.58
Capital 
Adequacy (%) 
N/A 18.10 13.40 14.50 12.40 13.60 17.00 16.10 13.17 14.39 15.30 14.50 13.40
Foreign 
Ownership (%) 
N/A N/A 14.73 28.96 33.41 44.20 60.72 61.60 83.60 85.44 85.93 86.12 86.03
Stock market 
capitalisation 
to GDP in % 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 15 20 11 37 34 27 34 42 51
Stock market 
turnover to 
capitalisation 
in % 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 29 167 161 18 19 14 15 18 17
Notes: C2 and C4 gives the share of total assets of the two and four largest banks, respectively. Capital adequacy  
on solo basis adheres to the Basel I definition i.e. bank own funds divided by risk weighted assets. EUR = 15.6466 
EEK. Data source: Bank of Estonia Financial Sector Statistics. 
 
In the next section a method that provides timely information about the contemporaneous state of banks 
is constructed in order to provide the supervisory agencies with a useful tool for analysing current 
banking conditions. 
 
                                                          
11 The tight currency board system, with its fixed exchange rate serving as a nominal anchor, helped contain the 
effects of the banking crises by giving credibility to the conduct of monetary policy.  
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3. The Distance-to-Default Measure of Bank Fragility 
 
The aim of this section is to provide a relatively concise, yet self-contained, overview of the asset value 
model and the time-varying distance-to-default measure which underpins the bank vulnerability 
analysis for Estonia.12 Bank fragility refers to the uncertainty surrounding a bank´s ability to service its 
debt and obligations.  
Exploiting the option nature of equity and making the simplifying assumptions of the Black and 
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) option pricing formula, the time path of the market value of total 
assets, proxied by a geometrical Brownian motion, follows the stochastic process 
 
(1) TT TTrVV εσσ +


 −+=
2
lnln
2
, 
 
which gives the asset value at time T (maturity of debt), given its current value V, and its standard 
deviation σ.13 The standard normal random component is denoted by serially uncorrelated Tε  ~ N(0,1) 
and the risk-free interest rate is r, if contingency claims are applicable in a risk-neutral world. The 
default point on the expiry day (t = T) is defined as lnVT = lnB where B is the (constant) amount of 
debt.14 The distance from the default point D can then be expressed as: 
 
(2) BTTrVBVD T ln2ln
lnln
2 −+


 −+=−= εσσ . 
 
It is useful to normalise the distance-to-default by the firm´s volatility, σ. Some manipulation leads to 
the normalised distance-to-default 
 
                                                          
12 Chan-Lau et al. (2004), Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and Gropp et al. (2002, 2004) have used the same framework. 
Crouhy et al. (2000) and Saunders and Allen (2002) offer accessible introductions to asset value and credit risk 
models. Duffie and Singleton (2003) provide an authoritative introduction to and comparison of asset value 
models. 
13 The credit risk model considers a firm which is financed through a single debt and a single equity issue. The 
debt comprises of a bond which matures at time t = T. An unobservable process describes the firm´s value Vt = Et 
+ B, where Et and B ascribe the outstanding equity and debt values, respectively. At time T, the firm´s debt 
matures. At that time either VT > B will hold, or it will not. In the former case, the remaining value of the firm ET 
= VT – B > 0 will belong to the equity holders. In the latter case, the firm defaults on its debt and ET = 0. 
Combining the above possibilities, a general expression for the value of the firm´s equity at t = T is ET = max(VT – 
B, 0). Looking at this formula, it is precisely the payoff of a European-type call option on the firm´s value VT with 
strike price B. Accordingly, the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for the value of a call option can be applied and 
investors´ implicit views of risk can be extracted from stock prices.     
14 Whereas the relevant measure of the bank´s assets is their market value, the book value of debt is the pertinent 
measure because that is the amount the bank´s must repay.  
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(3) 
T
Tr
B
V
T
D
DD σ
σ
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


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

=−= 2
ln
2
. 
 
The DD risk score can be viewed as a cardinal ranking relative to default risk, instead of the more 
conventional ordinal rankings offered by rating agencies.15 Since the random component of the bank´s 
asset returns is log-normally distributed, the corresponding expected default probability in terms of the 
cumulative Normal distribution N is calculated as 
 
(4) 













 −+


−=
T
Tr
B
V
Nprob σ
σ
2
ln
2
. 
 
The smaller DD is, the higher the default risk is. DD is a metric indicating how many standard 
deviations the equity holders´ call option is in-the-money. The smaller the distance-to-default DD, the 
more likely a default is to occur. To put it differently, the probability of default is precisely the 
probability of the call option expiring out-of-money. Gropp et al. (2002) have demonstrated that the 
option-based distance-to-default metric DD is a complete and unbiased indicator which gives an 
accurate indication of bank distress. DD gives a signal of increased fragility (i) if the bank´s asset 
values decline, (ii) if asset volatility increases, and (iii) if leverage increases. Supervisors may therefore 
use DD as a screening device to monitor banks.16 
However, things are not quite as simple as this would suggest. In terms of practical implementation of 
the model, a shortcoming of the asset value model is that the asset value is not observable. This makes 
assigning values to it and its volatility problematic. Still, the model provides a useful tool for modelling 
credit risk and bank vulnerability as it is straightforward to show that analytical solutions for both 
unobserved variables can be calculated from the firm´s equity market value, E, and its volatility, σE, 
using the system of equation below: 
 
(5) , ( ) ( )dNeBdNVE rT 21 −−=
 
                                                          
15 Reality, as usual, is more complicated. For extended frameworks producing default probabilities for more 
complex capital structures including equity warrants, convertible bonds, preferred equity, and common equity, see 
Bensoussan et al. (1994, 1995). We do not endeavour to cover this territory as the corresponding data is not 
available for Estonian banks.  
16 On the contrary, the firm´s stock price generally does not satisfy (ii) and (iii) due to the call option implicit in 
equity. 
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(6) ( )σσ dNE
V
E 1

= , 
 
(7) 
T
Tr
B
V
d σ
σ 


 ++


= 2
ln
2
1 , 
 
(8) Tdd σ−= 12 , 
 
Solving backwards yields the asset value V, asset volatility σ, and the option-based DD metric.17 With 
these results in mind, we wish to measure market participants´ beliefs concerning bank fragility in 
Estonia during transition, as distilled from equity prices.18 The results are presented in Section 4.  
 
4. Gauging Option-Based Fragility Scores for Estonian Banks During Transition  
 
We will now apply, on a monthly basis, the method of analysis proposed in the previous section to 
Estonian banks during the transition period. We shall first review the main data that are available and 
that have been used in our work. The main challenge when dealing with transition economies is the 
availability of long time series.  
To obtain results on bank fragility we use available monthly data for the transition period for all 
Estonian banks except one (Eesti Forexpank, since 21.01.1999 renamed Optiva Pank and since 
29.12.2000 Sampo Pank) publicly traded on the local stock exchange, either for the whole sample 
period or some sub-period.19 It should be noted that mergers and acquisitions and bank failings that 
occurred midway through our sample period caused some banks to drop out of the data set. Balance 
sheet data are taken from Bank of Estonia financial statistics, banks public reports and Tallinn Stock 
Exchange news releases. Daily market values of the equity of banks are from Tallinn Stock Exchange. 
Equity volatility has been approximated by the volatility of daily stock market returns over the 
preceding month. We make the common assumption that the maturity of the debt equals one year. 
We first calculate the distance-to-default fragility scale DD and the corresponding expected default 
probabilities for each sampled bank and for each time period t, using equity market and balance-sheet 
                                                          
17 In equation (5) the option value of equity is computed by “European options”. Alternatively, one might also 
compute the market value of equity by “American options” which can be exercised anytime before T. The quanti-
tative results, however, show only minor differences: the DD values are higher in terms of American options but 
the difference is small. The corresponding results are available upon request. 
18 Alternatively, the banking crisis literature has also suggested to use the share of non-performing loans as a 
measure of bank distress. Unfortunately, for many countries (including Estonia), such data are available only at 
low frequencies.  
19 The choice of the sample period is based on data availability. The DD risk score requires that banks are publicly 
traded and therefore the value of equity is market determined. Prior to the opening of the Tallinn stock exchange 
in May 1996, data is not available. 
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data. Our sample represents all relevant financial institutions.20 The time dimension of the dataset is 
constrained by the unavailability of longer stock price series for Estonian banks. Despite this restriction, 
several of the banks selected faced insolvency, mergers and failure-like episodes during the sample 
period. The results for the distance-to-default score DD and the corresponding expected default 
probabilities are illustrated in Figures 2 to 7 below. A concise overview over historic evolutions is also 
provided.  
 
Figure 2: The Behaviour of the DD Risk Score and Underlying Components for SEB Eesti 
Ühispank (Union Bank of Estonia) 
(Sample Period August 1996 to August 2000) 
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Notes: The data after August 2000 is ignored since σ is very small due to the takeover by SEB (Svenska Enskilda 
Banken). 
 
The images for Eesti Ühispank, in Figure 2, indicate that the DD measures and default probabilities 
have fluctuated with substantial peaks and troughs. SEB Eesti Ühispank´s primary strategic objective 
                                                          
20 Although the banks in our sample are few in number, they account for around 80% of the banking sector´s total 
assets over the sample period. Further information about the market shares is provided in Appendix A. 
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over the sample period was to establish a secure position among the largest universal banks in Estonia 
with ambitions to extend its operations to neighbouring Baltic States and Saint-Petersburg.21 
The bank’s risk measures indicate the period of increasing risk peaking in the aftermath of the stock 
market crash in October 1997. This period leading up to increased fragility was marked by rocketing 
share prices and high volatility. Within one year the Ühispank share price had grown eightfold. On 11 
September 1997 Ühispank received the investment level rating BBB- from IBCA. This reinforced the 
euphoria and Ühisbank subsequently issued subordinated debt, not just with the objective of meeting 
the increased minimum regulatory capital as of 1 October 1997 but mainly for funding expansionary 
strategies. In September 1997 the bank released the news that it would enter the Russian market by 
opening a bank in Saint Petersburg. Shortly after this decision the spillover effects from the Asian crisis 
reversed the stock market and volatilities increased. Uncertainty spread rapidly and market participants 
became more cautious regarding the downside risk of the stock market and risk of financial instability 
escalated. 
In November 1997 Eesti Ühispank issued a profit warning. In addition, the distress of Eesti Maapank 
was shaking the Estonian banking sector stability, culminating in the closure of the bank in June 1998. 
Consolidation became critical in order to survive. Eventually, on 22 April 1998, after long and stressful 
negotiations Ühispank and Tallinna Pank completed a merger. Ühispank declared losses from October 
1998, which summed up to a total loss above 290 million EEK as of the end 1998, leading to a further 
deterioration of confidence. In this situation the SEB proposal to acquire 32% of Ühispank share was 
received with great relief. This move restored confidence in the bank. Moody’s confirmed the Ühispank 
pre-crisis ratings, but indicated a positive outlook for the bank. Standard & Poor issued the bank with a 
rating of BB which put the Estonian banking sector risks on an equal level with Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia, but higher relative to other Baltic states due to the vulnerability of the economy from external 
risks. On 12 October 1999 SEB increased the strategic ownership to 50.15%. The consecutive takeover 
on 27 October 2000 finally increased the SEB ownership to 95%. By the end of 2000 SEB full 
ownership resulted in the termination of trade in Ühispank shares on the Tallinn Stock Exchange. 
The results for Hoiupank are provided in Figure 3. Hoiupank was the successor of the Soviet regime 
savings bank, inheriting a broad depositors base of domestic households. After the merger with 
Tööstuspank in September 1996 its share of corporate customers rose significantly and Hoiupank 
achieved the position of second largest market player until Ühispank and Põhja-Eesti Pank merged in 
May 1997. At the same time, Hoiupank successfully issued debt (400 million EEK) on the international 
capital markets and received a 160 million EEK subordinated loan from Credit Suisse First Boston. On 
26 September 1997 Moodys issued the bank with the long-term credit rating Baa2 and the financial 
strength rating D+. The prospects for attracting further foreign funding were better than ever. On 30 
September 1997 Hoiupank acquired FABA bank in Moscow and declared its intention to invest 30 
                                                          
21 Ühispank was Estonia’s third largest bank after Hansapank and Hoiupank until May 1997 when it surpassed 
Hoiupank and has since retained position of second largest bank. 
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million EEK over the next 18 months. In this environment the Bank of Estonia announced its intention 
to sell its share in Hoiupank to the present strategic investor Swedbank, whose holding was already 
12.5%. The transfer of whole Eesti Pank stake to Swedbank would have increased the Swedbank 
holding up to 25%. In view of this announcement, the Hoiupank management indicated their reluctance 
to cooperate with Swedbank and “share the cake”. The bank management launched the initiative to 
issue 3 million shares to Hoiupank staff. Flourishing stock market and good access to external liquidity 
offered a favourable platform for the realisation of the plan. In order to finance the purchase of shares 
the Hoiupank staff members limited company applied for a 6 months credit from Japanese Daiwa bank. 
The loan was collateralised with Hoiupank shares, but Hoiupank management also agreed to offer a 
Hoiupank guarantee to the credit. This decision turned out to be a fatal mistake. 
 
Figure 3: The Behaviour of the DD Risk Score and Underlying Components for Hoiupank 
(Sample Period August 1996 to June 1998) 
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At the beginning of October 1997 Bank of Estonia declared its intention to sell the rest of Hoiupank 
shares to Swedbank. Hoiupank staff had to hasten the issue project, but it was already too late. The 
stock market crash at the end of October and the consecutive Russian crisis drove Hoiupank shares 
below the minimum value necessary to cover the collateral of the Daiwa loan due in April 1998 and the 
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need for consolidation became acute.22 In January 1998, Hoiupank and Hansapank had already released 
a letter of intention for merger. The merger was to serve mutual interests – Hansapank was in need to 
increase the share capital and Hoiupank foresaw the troubles arising from the Daiwa affair. The merger 
contract was finally signed in June 1998 and Bank of Estonia approved the merger in July.23 Trade in 
Hoiupank shares was terminated at 15 July 1998. 
The dating of the DD scores and default probabilities in Figure 3 seems reasonable and reflects the 
impacts of the stock market crash in October 1997 and the Daiwa affair in spring 1998. DD started to 
decline already in June 1997 picking up the steadily increasing volatilities at the outset of stock market 
crash. As expected, the DD (default probability) decrease (increase) in the wake of the Daiwa affair was 
rather pronounced with a two month lead. The results therefore indicate that the option-based measures 
are indeed able to anticipate future rating changes. 
The results for Evea Pank are illustrated in Figure 4. Evea Pank was the smallest bank publicly listed 
on the stock market, enduring poor liquidity and high volatility. The market value of EVEA Pank 
remained moderate even at the peak in Tallinn Stock Exchange. On average the bank covered 2% of the 
market share over the sample period. EVEA Pank initially advocated the provision of a broad service 
range.  
This strategy, however, turned out to be costly for a small bank, hindering operational efficiency. For 
attracting customers the bank offered favourable deposit rates and “tailor-made” services for corporate 
customers, mainly small and medium size enterprises whose access to credit in larger banks was more 
complicated. In 1997 along the upturn in stock market the bank saw opportunities for improvement in 
profitability. As of 23 April 1997 the bank council continued to see healthy profit growth for 1997 from 
13 million EEK up to 15 million EEK. This profit increase had to be achieved with enforced activity on 
capital and money markets. In 1997 the bank purchased Russian government bonds for 146.8 million 
EEK. This fatal investment accounted for almost 20% of the bank’s assets. Bank reports remained 
optimistic until the third quarter of 1997. On 5 November 1997, however, the management announced a 
decrease in profitability due to the declining market value of the trading portfolio. The shortage of 
liquidity in the aftermath of stock market crash in October 1997 forced the bank to increase deposit 
rates substantially. Unlike the market leaders, EVEA Pank did not have access to international capital 
markets or syndicated credit-lines. Therefore, news of ERA Pank’s desire to acquire 33% of EVEA 
bank shares in December 1997 was welcomed. At 18 August 1998 ERA Pank acquired about 33% of 
EVEA Pank shares and replaced one board member. After the devaluation of the Russian rouble in 
August 1998, Evea Pank´s balance sheet weakened substantially and it emerged that the bank was 
unable to fully satisfy the legitimate claims of its customers. However, weaknesses in risk management 
                                                          
22 At 20 May 1998 Hoiupank declared potential losses from the Daiwa loan reaching up to 225 million EEK. 
23 The case of Hoiupank shows that cronyism does not necessarily stop at Estonia´s border. In 1997 several senior 
managers took out a $ 1.5 million foreign loan, using the bank´s equity as collateral, in order to buy – for 
themselves – part of the bank´s new equity offerings. The scheme was derailed by the stock market crash. The 
managers were fired as the bank merged with a competitor. 
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and loan assessment systems and poor corporate governance were also important contributors to these 
problems. At that point, EVEA Pank was effectively insolvent. Therefore, the bankruptcy procedure 
against EVEA Pank was launched at 2 October 1998.24 
 
Figure 4: The Behaviour of the DD Risk Score and Underlying Components for Evea Pank 
(Sample Period February 1997 to August 1998) 
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Note: The σ variable for June 1998 is so small that the numerical program terminated the DD calculation. 
 
There is no denying that although insolvency was foreseeable, the DD risk score and the corresponding 
default probabilities failed to indicate the likelihood of EVEA Pank to fall into crisis in summer 1998. 
A fairly concentrated shareholding structure and noisy measurement of share process in thin markets 
led to this result. Thus, the results provide evidence against the notion that market price data are 
uniformly reliable. 
The results for Eesti Maapank are available in Figure 5. Eesti Maapank was instituted in 1995 by way 
of a merger of four smaller local banks, which were unable to meet the minimum capital adequacy 
                                                          
24 The bankruptcy proceeding was initiated because equity capital of EVEA Pank was less than ECU 5 million. In 
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requirement at the end of 1995 or further down the road. The mergers took place as follows: 20 
November 1995 the merger of Virumaa Kommertspank and Rahvapank; 11 December 1995 merger of 
Virumaa Kommertspank and Keila Pank and 2 January 1996 merger between Virumaa Kommertspank 
and Maapank. On 10 May 1996 the shareholders of the merged institution decided to name the bank  
Eesti Maapank. The audited financial statements of the merged institution as of 1995 indicated losses of 
27.3 million EEK. Although the institution fell short of the prudential ratios, the Bank of Estonia was 
eager to offer the new entity more time to establish a well-functioning bank. The expected synergies, 
however, never emerged and the new institution was undermined by opportunism and internal conflicts. 
In May 1997, after long negotiations EBRD agreed to acquire 19% of bank shares. At the same time 
Swedfund granted Maapank a 7 year maturity subordinated loan of 24 million EEK. These 
developments were of significant help for the undercapitalised bank. Further optimism emerged along 
with the stock market boom. 
 
Figure 5: The Behaviour of the DD Risk Score and Underlying Components for Eesti Maapank 
(Sample Period March 1997 to June 1998) 
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addition, EVEA Pank did neither meet the capital adequacy ratio nor the established reserve requirement. 
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Losses stemming from weaknesses in risk management and loan assessment systems and poor corporate 
governance could be offset, the bank believed, by speculative trading on bull markets. While the bank’s 
trading portfolio was of negligible value at the beginning of 1996, the value at the end of 1997 was 
already 500 million EEK outnumbering the bank own funds more than seven times. In September 1997 
Maapank even announced its intention to list its shares on Tallinn Stock Exchange, but the subsequent 
developments scuppered this plan. 
Maapank initially managed to hide its true losses in the aftermath of Asian crisis, but at the beginning of 
1998 insiders were already aware that the bank was technically insolvent and its operations were 
dependent on overnight money market liquidity. Short-term borrowing was the only way the bank could 
meet its liabilities and reserve requirements. On 9 March 1998 an audit of Coopers & Lybrand 
discovered hidden losses of 192 million EEK not accounted for in bank financial statements. From 
April of that year Maapank encountered difficulties in securing funding from the money market and 
therefore the bank failed to meet reserve requirements. On 8 June 1998 Bank of Estonia terminated 
Eesti Maapank’s banking licence and bankruptcy procedures were opened on 16 June 1998. All in all, 
the bank was kept going for six months by implicit government support before half-hearted regulators 
finally decided to force Maapank into bankruptcy. The low DD scores and high default probabilities 
illustrated in Figure 5 accurately capture the high-risk bank and anticipate that the tightening of 
prudential requirements would prove fatal for Maapank.25 
The behaviour of the DD risk score and underlying components for Hansapank are depicted in Figure 6. 
Hansapank is Estonia´s biggest financial institution. Hansapank has been Estonia’s most successful 
bank throughout the transition period. Hansapank assumed the position as market leader by the end of 
1994 and has successfully defended this position ever since. In December 1995 Hansapank became the 
first Estonian bank to be listed on the Helsinki stock exchange. It was also, in October 1994, the first 
bank to receive a loan without government guarantee from the EBRD. 
Hansapank was the first bank to acknowledge the constraints of the domestic market. As early as Spring 
1996 Hansapank acquired a bank in Latvia and by the end of 2001 Hansapank was represented in all of 
the Baltic states. 
After the stock market peak Hansapank experienced liquidity shortages, coinciding with the first signs 
of the imminent Asian crisis in September 1997. On 1 September 1997 the executive board of the bank 
made a proposal to enlarge the Hansapank capital base in order to fund expansionary strategies in Baltic 
region. On 13 October 1997 an extraordinary shareholder meeting decided to enlarge the bank capital 
according to the following schedule: 5.5 million shares before 28 February 1998; 1 million shares 
before 11 October 1998 and 1 million shares toward Hansapank employees before 11 October 2000. 
The subsequent stock market plummet just ten days later rendered this plan unattractive. In order to 
overcome the funding constraints and address the medium term strategic objectives Hansapank 
                                                          
25 Their shares were not listed, but traded on the OTC market. Therefore the market was rather thin and highly 
volatile. 
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proposed a merger with Hoiupank in January 1998. The merger, however, was only finalised half a year 
later, in June 1998, after Hoiupank eventually realized its financial impairment in the aftermath of 
Asian and Russian crises. Moody’s reacted to the merger by downgrading Hansapank long term rating 
from Baa2 to Baa3. 
 
Figure 6: The Behaviour of the DD Risk Score and Underlying Components for Hansapank 
(Sample Period August 1996 to July 2004) 
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Further tensions grew in tandem with the Russian crisis. The closure of Maapank cultivated serious 
mistrust towards banking sector. After the devaluation of the Russian rouble in August 1998, 
Hansapank obtained a DM 10 million subordinated loan in September 1998. In the wake of Russian 
crisis the Swedish banks SEB and Swedbank discerned the opportunity to acquire Estonian banks. On 
29 September 1998 Swedbank and SEB publicly confirmed the SEB sale of all Hansapank shares to 
Swedbank. As a result the Swedbank share in Hansapank rose to 48.7%. Although Swedbank claimed 
its long-term objective was to hold only 25-35% of Hansapank shares, it increased its ownership further 
and finally in April 2005 Swedbank bought up the minority shares and achieved full ownership. 
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In view of EU accession the struggle for improved efficiency became even more important. The small 
market limitation had to be compensated with improving cost-efficiency and regional expansion. In 
2003 Hansapank entered the Russian market with a leasing subsidiary. In March 2005 Hansapank 
acquired the Kvest bank in Moskow. In November 2005 Moodys upgraded the bank’s financial strength 
rating up to C+ and gave a positive outlook on the bank’s prospects.  
How does DD react to these developments and, through DD, what types of changes in bank fragility can 
be captured? DD measures in Figure 6 clearly demonstrate the turmoil in stock market in Autumn 1997 
and the subsequent distress related to the Russian crisis in the second half of 1998. The DD fragility 
indicator declined 3-4 months prior to the outbreak of stock market crash, and preceded the first 
manifestations of the Russian crisis; the Hoiupank Daiwa loan affair; one month ahead and the 
Maapank failure two months ahead. In this sense, DD for Hansapank can again be considered to be  a 
forward-looking indicator. 
 
Figure 7: The Behaviour of the DD Risk Score and Underlying Components for Tallinna Pank 
(Sample Period August 1996 to June 1998) 
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Finally, the calibration results for Tallinna Pank are summarised in Figure 7. Tallinna Pank´s strength 
was good corporate governance. In mid-1996 the bank succeeded in issuing subordinated debt to 
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Swedfund and to a Nederland Development bank FMO, besides it received a 12 million DM credit line 
from EBRD. These and subsequent foreign capital injections enabled Tallinna Pank to enter the 
neighbouring markets in Latvia and Lithuania. By the end of 1996 Tallinna Pank acquired 20% of 
Latvian Saules Banka and instituted a leasing subsidiary in Riga. A year later a leasing business was 
also founded in Lithuania. 
During the financial turmoil of autumn 1997 markets for liquidity were squeezed. In December 1997 
the bank cut its profit outlook of 1997 by 22.7% but nonetheless the outlook was brighter. In that same 
month the bank received a 10 year maturity subordinated loan from the EBRD, which helped to 
strengthen the bank’s capital base. The bank decided to remain an independent bank and refused to 
accept the Ühispank merger proposal.  
The situation, however, worsened at the onset of the Russian crisis in Spring 1998 and the need for 
consolidation became acute in order to survive in the  hostile banking environment. Tallinna Pank was 
seen as the desired partner. In March 1998 Tallinna Pank received three proposals for mergers – from 
Investeermispank, Ühispank, and Hansapank. As Investeerimispank was considered too small and 
Hansapank was already in negotiations with Hoiupank, the most reliable option turned out to be 
Ühispank. On 22 April 1998 the merger between Tallinna Pank and Ühispank was finalised.26 
The DD measures pick up the increasing default risk since July 1997, i.e. three months ahead of the 
stock market crisis. Contrary to its larger competitors, however, Tallinna Pank’s DD score did not 
improve during the first six months of 1998, i.e. during the short tranquillity period between the stock 
market crash and outbreak of the Russian crisis. The default probabilities remained at a significantly 
higher level compared to the pre-crash period until the takeover acquisition in mid 1998. 
Prima facie, the results of the Estonian case study appear to indicate that the banking crises were 
triggered by idiosyncratic and common shocks. Market revaluations occurred rapidly, and exhibit cross-
bank patterns consistent with reasonable inferences. Furthermore, the risk score differences across 
banks also indicate that news about one bank did not cause investors to make inappropriate inferences 
about the conditions of other banks.27 The next section evaluates the timeliness of market valuations in 
comparison to credit rating risk scores for Hansapank, Hoiupank and Ühispank. We are forced to 
conduct this exercise on this subset of banks for which we have rating information. 
  
5. The Timeliness of the DD Risk Score Changes versus Credit Rating Migrations 
 
There is indeed considerable debate about the merits of option-based fragility indicators. This section 
therefore intends to provide an analysis of the informational content and timing of alternative fragility 
indicators. In addition to the DD risk score, we look at the information content of credit ratings (R)    
                                                          
26 At 22 July 1998 Tallinn Stock exchange terminated the trade of Tallinna Pank shares. 
27 This result seems to reject the possibility that bank investors routinely engage in “pure contagion” inferences 
about all banks.  
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and compare them with the DD measure.28 Our aim is to detect whether there exists a significant link 
between the market assessment, as measured by DD, and the rating agencies´ decisions to revise a given 
rating.29 Does rating agencies´ access to unique private information permit earlier identification of 
changes in bank condition? Since the assessments differ, it would be surprising if they collected exactly 
the same information at exactly the same times. 
We have converted the monthly history of credit ratings of each sampled bank base on Moody´s and 
Standard & Poor´s ratings and converted every alphabetic rating into a numerical value in order to make 
it comparable with the distance-to-default measure. We opt for a nonlinear conversion in order to reflect 
the fact that rating changes tend to be associated with increasingly larger changes in default 
probabilities when they take place at the lower end of the rating scale.30 More specifically, every grade 
has been transformed into the value of the historical default frequency as observed by Estrella (2000). 
The resulting grades are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Conversion of Alphabetic Ratings into Numerical Values 
Moody's Standard
& Poor´s
Fitch Average One Year
Default Rates 
Numerical 
Grade 
A1 A+ A+ 0.00015 1 
A2 A A 0.0002 1.3 
A3 A- A- 0.00035 2.3 
Baa1 BBB+ BBB+ 0.0012 8.0 
Baa2 BBB BBB 0.00135 9.0 
Baa3 BBB- BBB- 0.00305 20.3 
 
In order to assess the usefulness of DD in a systematic, operational manner, we use Granger causality 
tests. The Granger causality approach to the question of whether a variable x causes a variable y is to 
see how much of the current x can be explained by lagged values of x and then to test whether lagged 
values of y improve the fit. The variable x is said to be Granger-caused by y if the lagged variables of y 
                                                          
28 A chronology of rating migrations for Hansapank and Ühispank is provided in the Appendix B. Hoiupank has 
only experienced two rating readjustments: to Baa2 at 26 September 1997 and to Baa3 at 29 May 1998. The 
presence of government guarantees complicates the process of interpreting market assessments. If de facto or 
conjectural government guarantees blunt investors´ risk exposure, clear evidence of DD risk score changes may be 
difficult to find because they believe that the government will insulate them from losses. In Appendix B we 
therefore also provide support ratings where available.    
29 A number of studies have addressed the issue of whether equity data can usefully supplement numerical ratings 
in the US. Krainer and Lopez (2001) find that stock market information can help forecast downgrades in the 
supervisory ratings assigned to commercial banks. Gunther et al. (2001) find that stock prices provide useful 
predictive information even when taking into account past supervisory ratings. Bongini et al. (2002) have analysed 
the performance of alternative indicators of bank fragility in the East Asian countries during the years 1996-1998. 
Please note that numerical supervisory ratings from the Bank of Estonia are not available over the entire sample 
period and therefore cannot be used as a benchmark for banks´ soundness.  
30 In particular, the equity market is likely to be more sensitive to information about troubled, low-rated banks 
with high potential for failure. 
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are statistically significant. If not, then y does not Granger-cause x. Note that feedback is possible; x 
Granger-causes y and y Granger-causes x.31 
There are many ways in which to implement a test of Granger causality. One particularly simple 
approach uses the autoregressive specification of a bivariate vector autoregression for x and y. 
Technically a F-test can then be conducted to test for Granger causality. The test results for our 
historical sample are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3 provides a very mixed picture. It appears that Granger causality runs one-way from the distance 
to default measure (DD) to rating changes (R) for Hoiupank. For SEB Eesti Ühispank two-way 
causation (feedback) is indeed the case at the 10% level, while no causal effect can be detected for 
Hansapank. Neither market indicators nor rating scores cause each other; consistent with the hypothesis 
that both indicators are quite different. The analysis thus reveals that no one screen consistently 
outperforms the alternative measure in flagging higher-risk banks. Our results therefore indicate that 
market and ranking assessments complement one another quite well. Ranking agencies may obtain 
private information that is not available to market analysts. On the other hand, market analysts may be 
more forward-looking, making market assessments better predictors of future changes in bank 
condition.32 In other words, optimal vulnerability forecast would be based on both information sets. 
 
Table 3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Bank Obs. Lags Null Hypothesis F-Statistic 
Hansapank 93 3 DD does not Granger cause R 0.71 
(0.54) 
   R does not Granger cause DD 0.02 
(0.99) 
Hoiupank 19 3 DD does not Granger cause R 4.60 
(0.02) 
   R does not Granger cause DD 1.01 
(0.42) 
SEB Eesti Ühispank 39 9 DD does not Granger cause R 2.23 
(0.06) 
   R does not Granger cause DD 1.98 
(0.09) 
Notes: (i) The probability values are given below the F-statistics in brackets. (ii) Before coming to actual 
estimation, it is prudent to take a look at the time series characteristics of the data. A model in levels with 
integrated variables can display serious distortions in the test statistics and the Granger causality tests become 
even theoretically invalid. Pre-testing using unit root (ADF) tests leads us to difference all I(1) variables. (iii) A 
caveat of the approach is that Granger-causality tests are sensitive to the choice of lag length. In a first step, we 
have estimated the appropriate lag lengths via the BIC information criterion. If it turns out that there is remaining 
autocorrelation, then the lag length is increased and a Hendry-type testing down procedure takes place until no 
trace of serial autocorrelation can be found. (iv) In order to avoid losing observations at the beginning of sample 
period due to missing rating assignments before September 1997 the banks have been given risk grade equivalent 
to historical average default probability of unrated banks about equal to rating Baa3 or BBB-. This approach has 
been used by FDIC in scoring U.S banks. The arbitrarily given risk grades for observations pre September 1997 
                                                          
31 Although it is natural to test for so-called Granger causality, the term is a misnomer since it has nothing to do 
with causality in the more common use of the term. 
32 To be valuable, the DD market indicators need not be superior to ratings. They just have to add a new 
perspective or dimension that helps to provide a more complete picture of a bank´s financial soundness. 
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are also supported by the fact that according to the new Basel framework (option 1) the unrated banks attain risk 
scores one category less favourable then the sovereign of incorporation. Since September 1997, Estonian 
Sovereign rating was equal to Baa1, so the unrated banks risk score roughly equal to Baa3 is in principle 
consistent with this concept. 
 
We close this section with a word of caution. While the evidence seems relatively strong, we should not 
forget that our sample is fairly small and the sample period extends only over a few years.33 Keeping in 
mind this limitation, looking ahead the results in this paper underline the importance of using a plurality 
of risk scores when assessing bank vulnerability. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The Baltic countries have grown rapidly in the past ten years and have started to regain the ground lost 
under communism. Estonia is growing at about 8% a year. At that rate, its standard of living will double 
in about a decade. Over this transition period, Estonia´s banking system has undergone a significant 
transformation from a mono-banking system to a two-tiered system comprising of a central bank and 
commercial banks. 
Against this background we explore for individual Estonian banks the ability of market indicators to 
assess risk taking in banks during the transition period. Equity-based risk scores depend upon expected 
future payoffs to investors and are therefore inherently forward looking. What are the overall lessons 
that can be derived from the evidence? All in all, our results indicate that the distance-to-default 
measure of bank vulnerability is a reliable and encompassing measure of bank fragility. In particular, 
the results suggest that the high-frequency fragility measures extracted from market data are a 
promising, relatively low cost, early warning tool for bank fragility and therefore have practical value 
for supervisors.34 On the other hand, the option-based risk scores should be taken with a grain of salt 
when they are based on thin markets. In less developed markets it is therefore important to rely on a 
multiplicity of fragility indicators complementing each other and serving as a cross check of other 
evaluations, both for central banks and for the public at large. Another caveat pertains to our results, 
which stems from the small number of banks in the sample. Further systematic evidence on this issue 
would therefore be very useful since progress in this area will sharpen our understanding of financial 
markets.  
 
                                                          
33 Some notes of caution are in order concerning the empirical analysis of Estonian data. First, the market data are 
only available for a small number of banks. Second, there is a rather small trading volume for some banks, 
reliability of price information is therefore not entirely satisfactory. The fact that the market is still not deep 
enough implies that the time series of DD may be subject to disturbing factors such as temporary mispricing. 
34 Note that our empirical results and conclusions are based on historical data. We have no guarantee that stock 
market signals would continue to be useful under a regime that explicitly incorporates stock market signals into 
supervisory policy. One potential problem with market price based measures of risk is that bilateral causality may 
emerge. In considering the role of market prices in monetary policy operations, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) 
have pointed out that bilateral causality may emerge between market prices and market participants´ expectations 
concerning future monetary and supervisory policies.   
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Appendix A: Market Shares From 1993 Through 2003 As Measured by Total Assets in % 
 
 31.12. 
1993 
31.12.
1994 
31.12. 
1995 
31.12.
1996 
31.12.
1997 
31.12.
1998 
31.12.
1999 
31.12.
2000 
31.12. 
2001 
31.12. 
2002 
31.12. 
2003 
31.12.
2004 
Eesti 
Maapank  
2.63% 3.07% 4.57% 4.64% 4.41% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
SEB Eesti 
Ühispank  
13.88% 16.77% 17.75% 16.52% 24.47% 33.21% 29.65% 26.73% 31.60% 29.90% 30.80% 30.90%
Evea Pank  1.52% 1.99% 1.82% 1.78% 2.02% 1.45% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hansapank  15.01% 20.42% 22.72% 25.30% 24.77% 51.95% 54.82% 56.76% 53.10% 53.20% 50.40% 48.20%
Hoiupank  12.07% 14.75% 17.44% 19.81% 23.77% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tallinna 
Pank  
5.31% 6.10% 7.15% 9.89% 7.74% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Appendix B: Chronology of Rating Changes  for Hansapank and SEB Eesti Ühispank 
 
Hansapank SEB Eesti Ühispank 
Moody´s Long-Term Ratings: Moody´s Long-Term Ratings: 
26 September 1997        Baa2 23 July 1997 Baa3 
23 July 1998                 Baa3 14 March 2000 Baa2 
24 August 1999            Baa2 14 November 2000 Baa1 
14 March 2000              Baa1   
28 January 2002           A2   
12 December 2002       A1   
    
Moody´s Financial Strength Ratings: Moody´s Financial Strenght Ratings: 
26 September 1997      D+ 24 August 1999 D 
2 May 2001                   C- 14 November 2000 D & Positive Outlook 
29 July 2002                 C & Positive Outlook   
2 May 2003                  B/C   
    
Standards & Poors: N/A 
11 April 2000                BBB - - 
    
Fitch LT: Fitch LT: 
28 February 2002        A- 11 September 1997 BBB- 
29 April 2004                A 4 March 2000 BBB 
  29 September 2000 BBB+ 
    
Fitch Support Rating: Fitch Support Rating: 
28 June 2001        3 Before 4 March 2000 4 
Before 6 November 2003 2 4 March 2000 3 
After 6 November 2003    1 After 22 July 2003 1 
Notes: Support ratings offer Fitch's judgement of a potential supporter's (either a sovereign state's or an 
institutional owner's) propensity to support a bank and of its ability to support it. Its ability to support is set by the 
potential supporter's own Fitch Long-term debt rating, both in foreign currency and, where appropriate, in local 
currency. Support ratings have a direct link to Long-term debt ratings, but they do not, however, assess the 
intrinsic credit quality of a bank. Rather they communicate Fitch Ratings' judgement on whether the bank would 
receive support should this become necessary. “1” denotes a bank for which there is an extremely high probability 
of external support. The potential provider of support is very highly rated in its own right and has a very high 
propensity to support the bank in question. “5” denotes a bank for which external support, although possible, 
cannot be relied upon. Data sources: Banks homepages and HEX homepage (previous Tallinn Stock Exchange). 
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